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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 721 (1991)

1. It will be recalled that resolution 721 (1991) of 27 November 1991, which was adopted unanimously, reads, in its operative part, as follows:

> "The Security Council,
>
> ...
>
> 1. Approves the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy and expresses the hope that they will pursue their contacts with the Yugoslav parties, as rapidly as possible, so that the Secretary-General can present early recommendations to the Security Council including for the possible establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia;
>
> 2. Endorses the statement made by the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General to the parties that the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation cannot be envisaged without, inter alia, full compliance by all parties with the agreement signed in Geneva on 23 November 1991 and annexed to the letter of the Secretary-General (S/23239);
>
> 3. Strongly urges the Yugoslav parties to comply fully with that agreement;
>
> 4. Undertakes to examine and take appropriate action without delay upon the recommendations of the Secretary-General mentioned above, including in particular any recommendation for the possible establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia;
>
> 5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter until a peaceful solution is achieved."

2. Following the adoption of resolution 721 (1991) I asked my Personal Envoy, Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, to travel once again to Yugoslavia on my behalf.

He did so and remained in Yugoslavia from 1 to 9 December 1991. Once again, as was the case on two of his earlier missions, Mr. Vance and his party travelled on a special aircraft generously made available by the Government of Switzerland. I wish to express here my profound appreciation for this further gesture of support on the part of Switzerland for the work of the Organization. The composition of the official party that accompanied Mr. Vance on this occasion, together with the programme of the mission, are set out in annex I to the present report. This was Mr. Vance's fourth mission to the area since the adoption of Security Council resolution 713 (1991) on 25 September 1991. His first mission had taken place from 11 to 18 October 1991 and is described in my report (S/23169) of 25 October 1991 to the Council. His second mission spanned the period from 3 to 9 November 1991 and on 11 November I provided an informal briefing to the members of the Security Council about its outcome. The third mission extended from 17 to 24 November 1991 and by a letter which I subsequently addressed to the President of the Security Council on 24 November (S/23239), I reported thereon to the Council. It was during that mission that the Geneva Agreement, which is appended to that letter, was signed on 23 November 1991.

3. The main purpose of Mr. Vance's most recent visit to Yugoslavia was twofold: first, to urge the three Yugoslav parties to the Geneva Agreement of 23 November to comply fully with the commitments into which they had entered on that occasion; and, second, to carry forward with the same parties discussions which he and Under-Secretary-General Goulding had initiated during the preceding mission, with a view to defining a concept and operational plan for a peace-keeping operation which would be acceptable to the parties, and which I might recommend to the Security Council if the conditions existed for the establishment of a peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia. At the same time as Mr. Vance's mission, a small team led by the Director of Field Operations Division visited Yugoslavia to undertake a preliminary examination of the logistical environment in the country.

I. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENT OF 23 NOVEMBER 1991

4. In connection with the implementation of the Geneva Agreement, Mr. Vance focused in his discussions in Yugoslavia on the lifting by Croatia of the remaining blockade of Yugoslav National Army (JNA) barracks and installations inside Croatia and the withdrawal from that Republic of the personnel, weapons and military equipment in those barracks and installations. He urged all parties most strongly to give effect to the unconditional cease-fire to which they had agreed at Geneva. Additionally, he gave serious attention to the humanitarian situation in the country and urged that humanitarian assistance be provided as fully and rapidly as possible - particularly to displaced persons.

A. Unblocking and withdrawal of JNA units in Croatia

5. Following the signature of the Geneva Agreement on 23 November, the unblocking of the hitherto blockaded JNA barracks and facilities in Croatia and the withdrawal from Croatia of unblocked personnel, weapons and military equipment had proceeded at a somewhat quickened pace. This process was, however, still attended by difficulties and these were apparent at the Marshall Tito barracks in Zagreb and at other military bases/facilities, especially in the port of Split. As a result of the latter difficulties, Mr. Vance asked his Special Adviser, Ambassador Herbert S. Okun, to travel ahead to Zagreb in an effort to assist the parties in the process, and this he did on 26 November. On 29/30 November, Ambassador Okun visited the blockaded facilities at Split together with the head of the European Community-led Monitor Mission, Ambassador Dirk van Houten. Subsequently, a very serious difficulty arose when, on 3 December, the ZMAJ military aircraft repair and maintenance facility of JNA, located on the outskirts of Zagreb, was blockaded.

6. Following his own arrival in Yugoslavia, Mr. Vance was informed by both the JNA leadership and by the Croatian authorities that the difficulties over the future disposition of plant and equipment at the ZMAJ facility represented a potential breaking point in the entire process. On 6 December, Ambassador Okun, who had by that time joined Mr. Vance at Belgrade, was once again dispatched to Zagreb to help to resolve the difficulties over ZMAJ. During the next 48 hours, he was in touch with all concerned parties, including the leadership of the ZMAJ and other facilities. Thanks to the round-the-clock work of Ambassador Okun, Ambassador van Houten and others, I was advised on 8 December that the parties had reached full agreement at Zagreb resolving all outstanding issues with respect to the lifting of the blockade of all JNA facilities in Croatia and the relocation of all JNA personnel and equipment involved. A facsimile reproduction of the text of the joint statement of 8 December is attached to the present report as annex II.

B. The unconditional cease-fire

7. In the days following the Geneva Agreement of 23 November 1991, there arose an increased level of hope that the cease-fire agreed to on that occasion would take hold. That hope was sustained by a certain reduction in the incidence of armed exchanges. During the week of 25 November, however, there took place a number of artillery and other attacks against various points in Croatia. At the same time, as indicated in paragraph 6 above, the unblocking/withdrawal process slowed down. In this connection, Mr. Vance was informed by senior defence officials at Belgrade of their view that these two developments were linked. In this period Mr. Vance continued to urge full resumption and the earliest conclusion of the process of unblocking and withdrawal, while on the other hand stressing the need for full and immediate implementation of the cease-fire agreement. None the less, in those days, a number of artillery and rocket attacks were launched against parts of eastern Slavonia in the Republic of Croatia, and especially on the town of Osijek and its hinterland. Then, in addition to a further attack on Osijek there took

place, at almost precisely the same moment on 6 December, a deeply shocking artillery attack on the civilian population in the historic centre of Dubrovnik. Mr. Vance, who was in Sarajevo when he learned of these developments, immediately protested against these outrageous acts to the Federal Secretary for National Defence, for he could see no possible justification for them. I myself reiterated these sentiments in a public statement issued in New York on the same day. It remains unclear as to whether the two above-mentioned attacks were linked. Subsequently, there have been armed clashes on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, including again in eastern Slavonia, and in western Slavonia. There have in the past two weeks also been credible reports of tactical advances by regular military units of JNA and by Serbian irregular armed groups in the direction of Osijek, in violation of the unconditional cease-fire agreement. Meanwhile Croatian forces have for their part been accused by JNA of numerous provocative violations of the cease-fire agreement. At least some of these charges are not without foundation. It is the view of my Personal Envoy that all sides, and especially the irregular forces, have been wanting in observing the Geneva Agreement in respect of the cease-fire. It also appears to be the case that the cease-fire violations by JNA have been more numerous and certainly more violent.

C. Humanitarian aspects of the Geneva Agreement

8. The humanitarian aspect of the Geneva Agreement is addressed in paragraphs 15 to 20 below.

II. FEASIBILITY OF A PEACE-KEEPING OPERATION IN YUGOSLAVIA

9. As stated above, the second purpose of Mr. Vance's most recent mission to Yugoslavia was to pursue discussion of the feasibility of a United Nations peace-keeping operation there.

10. It will be recalled from my letter of 24 November 1991 to the President of the Security Council (S/23239) that during his previous mission, from 17 to 23 November 1991, Mr. Vance had been told by the Yugoslav participants at the meeting convened at Geneva on 23 November 1991, namely Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, President of the Republic of Serbia, Mr. Franjo Tudjman, President of the Republic of Croatia, and General Valkjo Kadijevic, Secretary of State for National Defence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that they wanted to see the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation as soon as possible; they had generally welcomed a possible concept for such an operation, its mandate, its organization and the areas where it would be deployed, which had been put forward in preliminary form by Mr. Vance in Geneva.

11. During his most recent mission, in the course of further meetings with the above-mentioned leaders, as well as with a number of other personalities, including Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, President of the Republic of

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Vance and Mr. Goulding further defined and elaborated the concept which they had put forward at Geneva. Their basic approach was to concentrate a United Nations peace-keeping force in those areas of Croatia in which Serbs constitute the majority or a substantial minority of the population and where inter-communal tensions have led to armed conflict in the recent past. It was hoped that by thus tackling the heart of the fires which have recently blazed in Yugoslavia, a further spread of the conflagration could be avoided and the necessary conditions created for successful negotiations on an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.

12. On this basis, United Nations troops and police monitors would be deployed in these areas, which would be designated as "United Nations Protected Areas" (UNPAs). They would be demilitarized and all armed forces in them would be either withdrawn or disbanded. The role of the United Nations troops would be to ensure that the areas remained demilitarized and that all persons residing in them were protected from fear of armed attack. The role of the United Nations police monitors would be to ensure that the local police forces carried out their duties without discriminating against persons of any nationality or abusing anyone's human rights. As the United Nations Force assumed its responsibilities in the UNPAs, all of the JNA forces deployed elsewhere in Croatia would be relocated outside the Republic. The United Nations Force would also, as appropriate, assist the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations in the return of all displaced persons who so desired to their homes in the UNPAs.

13. All aspects of this concept were discussed at length by Mr. Vance and Mr. Goulding with their interlocutors. By the end of their visit, they were in a position to prepare a working paper which described in some detail the concept and an operational plan for putting it into effect which had emerged from the discussions, and with which their three principal interlocutors had all expressed a wide measure of agreement. Copies of this paper, the text of which is contained in annex III to the present report, were given to Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman and to General Kadijevic on 8 December 1991. Initial reactions which Mr. Vance received from them before he left Yugoslavia confirmed their support for his approach. However, it has become clear, both from his discussions with other interlocutors and from statements to the press, that at least one leader of the Serbian communities in Croatia was not at that time able to accept all aspects of the concept and operational plan.

14. Throughout his discussions, Mr. Vance made it clear to his interlocutors that he had not yet decided whether to advise me that the necessary conditions existed for the establishment of a peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia. He said that his decision would continue to depend on sustained evidence that the Yugoslav participants at the meeting at Geneva on 23 November 1991 were seriously implementing all aspects of the agreement signed on that occasion. It would also depend on his receiving from those participants categorical assurances that all concerned would accept an operation on the lines discussed and that they would give it the cooperation it would require to carry out its mandate. For the reason described in the preceding paragraph, the assurances sought from President Milosevic would be especially important in this regard.

III. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA

15. The humanitarian dimensions of the Yugoslavia problem, on which I dwelt at some length in my report of 25 October 1991 (S/23169), have continued to grow. The number of persons displaced by the conflict now exceeds 500,000 and is increasing still. Two thirds of the displaced persons are women and children. Indigenous resources for assistance to this population are rapidly being depleted, and the local hospitality which to date has permitted the placement of well over half of the displaced persons with host families is eroding. The ever more difficult economic situation, shortages, the high cost of certain basic household items and of fuel, as well as rising unemployment, and the onset of winter are likely to compel even more displaced persons to seek shelter in collective facilities. Although most of the displaced remain within the frontiers of Yugoslavia's six Republics, a growing number have sought refuge in other countries, in particular in Hungary, which now hosts over 40,000 persons.

16. In response to a request on my part, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has taken the lead in coordinating humanitarian assistance of the United Nations system to the displaced within Yugoslavia. A joint funding appeal for an initial six-month programme, valued at US$ 24.3 million, was issued by the High Commissioner on 3 December 1991, covering the coordinated programmes of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) ($16.47 million), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) ($5.11 million), and the World Health Organization ($2.72 million). The United Nations programme will be implemented in close cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross. The assistance foreseen consists, in the first stage, of staple food and household items, essential medicines and medical equipment, infant and children's foods, child-care articles, educational support, and specialized care for persons suffering from war-related trauma. UNHCR is delivering emergency aid in December in the form of blankets and basic foodstuffs, while the programme outlined in the joint appeal will be implemented as from 1 January 1992. Although aid from bilateral, multilateral and private sources is flowing into various parts of Yugoslavia, prolongation of the conflict and the spectre of even larger displacement make imperative an early and strong donor response to the coordinated United Nations assistance programme. For its part, UNICEF has in particular been active at Dubrovnik, where a senior official has been present throughout the past weeks.

17. Alongside the provision of material assistance, attention must be devoted to the protection of the displaced population. Incidents of detention of displaced persons, of organized movements of displaced persons into areas from which others have fled and of pressure on specific groups to evacuate certain villages or towns have given rise to serious concern. Mr. Vance raised this matter with his interlocutors, including with President Milosevic on 2 December and again on 5 December. A full and detailed response to his enquiries is awaited. The impossibility for many displaced persons to avail themselves of their acquired rights (such as pensions or other social benefits) limits their ability to be self-reliant and places additional

burdens on the local authorities and on the international community. Prospects for displaced persons to avail themselves of the right to return to their homes seem in many areas to be dim. In addition, the very nature of the war makes the delivery of assistance to civilian victims of the conflict in some areas difficult or impossible.

18. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) now has some 50 delegates based at Belgrade, Dubrovnik, Ljubljana, Osijek (Slavonia), Rijeka, Split and Zagreb. Since mid-October 1991, ICRC has participated in a multilateral negotiating commission, meeting almost daily at Zagreb to discuss, among other issues, the release of prisoners and the protection of the civilian population. On 9 November, more than 700 prisoners were released simultaneously by the two parties to the present conflict in Bosanski Samac (Bosnia Herzogovina) under ICRC supervision. Then, following an agreement reached at Zagreb on 8 December between the Croatian Government and the Federal Army, under the auspices of ICRC, the simultaneous liberation of 1,600 prisoners was to have taken place on 10 December 1991.

19. At the invitation of ICRC, plenipotentiary representatives of the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Army met at Geneva on 26 and 27 November 1991 and made a common reaffirmation of their willingness and intention to apply the provisions of international humanitarian law.

20. Other activities being carried out at present by ICRC in Yugoslavia include visits to some 4,000 prisoners, the operation of a tracing agency, the provision of relief supplies to displaced persons, the operation of two relief ships on the Dalmatian Coast, the provision of medical aid and, as indicated above, the promotion of respect for humanitarian principles and for the Red Cross emblem.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

21. The conditions for establishing a peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia still do not exist. The Security Council in its resolution 721 (1991) underscored the position expressed by Mr. Vance that such an operation could not be envisaged without full compliance by the parties with the Geneva Agreement of 23 November 1991. In this connection, it is important to note that while the process of unblocking and withdrawal from Croatia of those JNA units hitherto blockaded is at present proceeding, the unconditional cease-fire remains unimplemented. As regards the humanitarian aspects of the agreement, the situation is addressed in paragraphs 15 to 20 above.

22. In the circumstances prevailing today, there is a most urgent need for the three Yugoslav parties who signed the Geneva Agreement of 23 November 1991 (namely President Milosevic of the Republic of Serbia, President Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia and General Kadijevic, Federal Secretary for National Defence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) to ensure full compliance with the terms of that agreement. This is not only required of

them by virtue of their signatures on the document, it is also essential in order to facilitate the resumption of the political negotiations for a peaceful resolution to the problems of Yugoslavia and her peoples.

23. In the period immediately ahead, the parties must - as confirmed most recently in the Zagreb Joint Statement of 8 December 1991 - complete expeditiously the unblocking of all remaining JNA barracks and facilities in Croatia and the relocation of blockaded personnel and military equipment to points outside that Republic. The parties need also to observe, and to ensure that all others observe, the agreed unconditional cease-fire. An effective cease-fire as an essential precondition for the deployment of a peace-keeping operation does not mean that random and occasional violations of the cease-fire would rule out such an operation. What it does mean is that before I could recommend that the Security Council take so expensive and innovative a step, there would have to be sustained evidence that the Yugoslav leaders are willing and able to implement agreements which they have signed. Indeed, I see no reason for further cease-fire agreements in the present conflict. What is needed is immediate and continuing compliance with commitments already entered into by the parties. The Security Council may wish to consider ways by which it would seek to ensure such compliance.

24. Full compliance with the Geneva Agreement of 23 November 1991 would permit accelerated consideration of the question of establishing a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia. I believe that a solid basis for such consideration is provided by the Concept Paper which is attached to the present report as annex III and which has met with a wide measure of agreement from the parties to the Geneva Agreement of 23 November 1991. In the meantime, I and my Personal Envoy await the assurances which we have sought in particular from President Milosevic, that all presently armed elements would extend full support to the kind of peace-keeping operation described in the Concept Paper. The importance of this consideration cannot be over-emphasized.

25. A soundly-based and effective cease-fire would further open the way for constructive negotiations between the representatives of the Republics. In this respect, the Conference on Yugoslavia, under the Chairmanship of Lord Carrington, enjoys the full support of the Security Council, as reflected in resolution 713 (1991). The Conference has been adjourned since 5 November, although Lord Carrington held an informal stock-taking session with the Presidents of Yugoslavia's six republics on 9 December. The Conference, it will be recalled, is guided by a number of considerations, including those set forth in the Declaration issued by the Twelve member States of the European Community at Rome on 8 November 1991 (S/23203). That declaration stated inter alia that "the prospect of recognition of the independence of those republics wishing it can only be envisaged in the framework of an overall settlement". The Conference has also, with the agreement of its participants, ruled out any changes in external or internal borders by means of force. I believe that any selective, uncoordinated departure from those principles could hold very serious dangers, not only for the republics of Yugoslavia, but for all of her peoples and indeed for the maintenance of peace and security in

the region. It was in this connection that, on 10 December 1991, I addressed a letter to the current President of the Council of Ministers of the European Community, Foreign Minister van den Broek of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the text of which is reproduced as annex IV to the present report.

26. It seems clear that the peoples and Republics of Yugoslavia will continue for a considerable time to suffer the adverse consequences of the conflict, even if there is an early end to the present hostilities. Even in that event, the effect of the conflict on the domestic economy and on future relations with traditional trading partners will be long-lasting. These consequences will of course be greatly magnified by continued fighting.

27. The general situation in Yugoslavia continues to worsen. The crisis in the humanitarian area in particular is deepening. In this respect, I strongly urge Governments to respond positively to the appeal that has been made on my behalf by the High Commissioner for Refugees for the joint humanitarian programme being coordinated by her Office. The present conflict and its attendant suffering can be brought to an end, if there is sufficient political will among the country's senior political and military leaders. The international community, already responding to many crises elsewhere has been, and is, I believe, prepared to assist the Yugoslav peoples if the conditions described in this report are met. It is my most sincere hope that the Yugoslav political and military authorities will grasp the opportunity afforded by such readiness.

28. I and my Personal Envoy will remain actively seized of this matter and, with his most valued collaboration, I shall keep the Security Council informed of developments, in particular as to whether the unconditional cease-fire envisaged in Geneva on 23 November 1991 is taking hold effectively.

Annex I

Fourth mission to Yugoslavia of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, the Honourable Cyrus R. Vance

(1-9 December 1991)

A. Composition of the official party

1. The mission was led by the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, the Honourable Cyrus R. Vance, and comprised also the following members:

Mr. Marrack Goulding
Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs

Ambassador Herbert S. Okun
Special Adviser to the Personal Envoy

Mr. J. P. Kavanagh
Senior Officer
Executive Office of the Secretary-General

Colonel H. Purola
Deputy Military Adviser to the Secretary-General

Mr. H. Heitmann
Political Affairs Officer
Office for the Research and Collection of Information

2. Further United Nations Secretariat staff members participating in the mission were: Miss Susan Dicey, Social Sciences Assistant; Mr. Robert Balzer, Operations Officer, and Mr. Ernesto Triana and Mr. John Linehan, Communications Officers.

B. Programme of meetings during the Fourth Vance Mission

Monday, 2 December 1991 (Belgrade)

1000 General V. Kadijevic, Federal Secretary for National Defence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

1200 Mr. S. Milosevic, President of the Republic of Serbia

1700 Dr. R. Karadzic, President of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Tuesday, 3 December 1991 (Osijek)

1100 Briefing by JNA Commander of Novi Sad Corps, General B. Andpije, at his headquarters in Dalj

1230 Visit to Osijek and briefing by the Mayor, Professor Dr. Z. Kramaric and tour of city

1545 Further meeting with JNA officers at Dalj

Wednesday, 4 December 1991 (Belgrade/Zagreb)

0900 General V. Kadijevic

1540 Mr. F. Tudjman, President of the Republic of Croatia

1715 Dr. H. Kacic, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs

1825 Dr. M. Granic, Vice-President of the Republic of Croatia

1915 Ambassador Dirk Jan van Houten, Head of the EC-led Monitor Mission

2100 Mr. F. Greguric, Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia

Thursday, 5 December 1991 (Belgrade)

1500 President S. Milosevic

1650 General V. Kadijevic

1800 (Mr. Goulding met with Messrs. Babic and Hadjic, Serb leaders from Krajina and Eastern Slavonia respectively)

1810 Mr. A. Markovic, Federal Prime Minister

Friday, 6 December 1991 (Sarajevo/Belgrade)

1000 Mr. A. Izetbegovic, President of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

1115 Mr. S. Kljuic, President of the Democratic Croat Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina

1155 Simultaneous meeting with Messrs. Karadjic and Kljuic, and with Mr. R. Mahmutcehadic, President of the Democratic Action Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina

1300 President A. Izetbegovic

1600 Ambassador Siegel of Austria
approx.

1700 Ambassador Eiff of Germany
approx.

1800 Mr. M. Mendiluce, UNHCR Coordinator for Yugoslavia
approx.

1900 President S. Milosevic

Saturday, 7 December 1991 (Belgrade)

1000 Mr. K. Gligorov, President of Macedonia

1715 President S. Milosevic

1830 General V. Kadijevic

Sunday, 8 December 1991

1400 Mr. B. Loncar, Acting Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs

Work on report to Secretary-General

N.B. As indicated in the body of the present report, Ambassador Herbert S. Okun, Special Adviser to the Personal Envoy, was engaged throughout the period 6 to 8 December in a negotiation at Zagreb with all concerned parties regarding the unblocking of all remaining JNA facilities in Croatia.

Annex II

Joint statement by Dr. M. Granic, Vice-President of the Republic of Croatia, and General A. Raseta, Commanding General of the 5th Army District of the Yugoslav National Army, issued at Zagreb on 8 December 1991

We, the undersigned, meeting today, Sunday, 8 December 1991, in Zagreb as plenipotentiaries for our respective parties, and after careful examination and discussion, have reached agreement with regard to all outstanding issues for implementation with immediate effect:

1. With regard to the barracks at Dugo Selo:

   - Completion of removal of mines;

   - Evacuation of the garrison and its relocation;

   Adequate transport capacity may be deployed to this end.

2. A formula for sharing facilities and equipment of the ZMAJ facility, thus permitting evacuation of servicemen and agreed equipment from the facility and from Pleso airbase. Combat aircraft currently undergoing servicing or otherwise located at the facility will also be free to leave. Adequate air cargo capacity will be allowed in to complete the evacuation.

3. A formula for sharing outstanding equipment at the Ivan Gosnjak Technical Training Centre, thus permitting its immediate evacuation.

4. Evacuation of the Military Hospital and its release to the Croatian authorities for treatment of all patients.

The parties further note that in addition to successful evacuation arrangements concluded for Sibenik and Pula, arrangements for Split are well in hand. They further noted that mine-clearing arrangements at the Marshall Tito barracks are well in hand.

With this agreement the parties concur that all outstanding issues have been resolved with respect to the blockade lifting of all Yugoslav National Army (JNA) facilities in Croatia and the relocation of all JNA personnel and equipment involved, as set out in the Hague Agreement of 18 October 1991 and the Geneva Agreement of 23 November 1991, as well as the Zagreb implementing Agreement of 22 November 1991.

Both parties wish to express their recognition of the roles played by Ambassador Dirk Jan van Houten and Ambassador Herbert S. Okun in helping to bring this agreement to its final, successful conclusion.

For the Republic of Croatia	For the Yugoslav Army
(Signed) Dr. Mate GRANIC	(Signed) General Andrija RASETA
Witnessed by	
(Signed) Ambassador Dirk Jan VAN HOUTEN	(Signed) Ambassador Herbert S. OKUN

Annex III

Concept for a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia, as discussed with Yugoslav leaders by the Honourable Cyrus R. Vance, Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General and Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs

November/December 1991

General principles

1. A United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia would be an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. It would not prejudge the outcome of such negotiations.

2. The operation would be established by the United Nations Security Council, acting on a recommendation by the Secretary-General. Before making such a recommendation, the Secretary-General would need to be satisfied that all concerned in the conflict were, in a serious and sustained way, abiding by the arrangements, including an unconditional cease-fire, agreed at Geneva on 23 November 1991. He would also need to receive, through his Personal Envoy, categorical assurances that all the Yugoslav parties concerned in the conflict accepted the concept which he intended to recommend to the Security Council and that they would provide all necessary assistance and cooperation to enable the peace-keeping operation to carry out its functions.

3. The military and police personnel required for the operation would be contributed, on a voluntary basis in response to a request from the Secretary-General, by the Governments of Member States of the United Nations. The contributing States would be approved by the Security Council, on the recommendation of the Secretary-General after consultation with the Yugoslav parties.

4. All members of the peace-keeping operation would be under the operational command of the Secretary-General and would not be permitted to receive operational orders from the national authorities. They would be required to be completely impartial between the various parties to the conflict. Those personnel who were armed would have standing instructions to use force to the minimum extent necessary and normally only in self-defence.

5. In accordance with its normal practice, the Security Council would probably establish the operation for an initial period of six months. Subject to the Council's agreement, the operation would remain in Yugoslavia until a negotiated settlement of the conflict was achieved. The Secretary-General would submit regular reports to the Security Council, normally every six months. These reports would contain his recommendations on extension of the operation's mandate.

6. The operation would be financed collectively by the Member States of the United Nations. But the various Yugoslav authorities would be expected to make available to the United Nations, free of charge, as much as possible of the accommodation and other facilities and supplies, such as food and fuel, that would be required by the operation. They would also be asked to conclude with the United Nations agreements concerning the privileges, immunities and facilities which the operation and its members would need in order to carry out their functions, especially complete freedom of movement and communications.

Basic concept

7. United Nations troops and police monitors would be deployed in certain areas in Croatia, designated as "United Nations Protected Areas". These areas would be demilitarized; all armed forces in them would be either withdrawn or disbanded. The role of the United Nations troops would be to ensure that the areas remained demilitarized and that all persons residing in them were protected from fear of armed attack. The role of the United Nations police monitors would be to ensure that the local police forces carried out their duties without discriminating against persons of any nationality or abusing anyone's human rights. As the United Nations Force assumed its responsibilities in the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs), all JNA forces deployed elsewhere in Croatia would be relocated outside that republic. The United Nations Force would also, as appropriate, assist the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations in the return of all displaced persons who so desired to their homes in the UNPAs.

The United Nations Protected Areas

8. The UNPAs would be areas in Croatia in which the Secretary-General judged that special arrangements were required during an interim period to ensure that a lasting cease-fire was maintained. They would be areas in which Serbs constitute the majority or a substantial minority of the population and where inter-communal tensions have led to armed conflict in the recent past. As already stated, the special arrangements in these areas would be of an interim nature and would not prejudge the outcome of political negotiations for a comprehensive settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.

9. There would be three UNPAs: Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Krajina. They would comprise the following opstine or parts of opstine:

Eastern Slavonia:
- Beli Manastir
- Those parts of Osijek which lie east of Osijek city
- Vukovar
- Certain villages in the extreme eastern part of Vinkovci

Western Slavonia:	Grubisno Polje
	Daruvar
	Pakrac
	The western parts of Nova Gradiska
	The eastern parts of Novska
Krajina:	Kostajnica
	Petrinja
	Dvor
	Glina
	Vrgin Most
	Vojnic
	Slunj
	Titova Korenica
	Donji Lapac
	Gracac
	Obrovac
	Benkovac
	Knin

Before deployment of the Force began, the exact boundaries of the UNPAs would be decided by an advance party of the United Nations Force, after consulting local leaders.

The deployment and functions of the United Nations Force

10. The function of protecting the inhabitants of the UNPAs would be shared between the United Nations Force's infantry units and its civilian police monitors. The infantry would ensure that the UNPAs remained demilitarized. The police monitors would ensure that the local police carried out their duties without discrimination against any nationality and with full respect for the human rights of all residents of the UNPAs.

11. The infantry units would be deployed throughout the UNPAs. They would be lightly armed but would use armoured personnel carriers and helicopters. They would control access to the UNPAs by establishing check-points on all roads and principal tracks leading into them and at important junctions inside them. At these check-points they would stop and, if necessary, search vehicles and individuals to ensure that no military formations or armed groups entered the UNPAs and that no weapons, ammunition, explosives or other military equipment were brought into them. They would patrol extensively inside the UNPAs on foot, and by vehicle and helicopter. They would also investigate any complaints made to them about violations of the demilitarized status of the UNPAs. Any confirmed violations would be taken up with the offending party and would, if necessary, be reported by the Secretary-General to the Security Council. If serious tension were to develop between nationalities in a UNPA, the United Nations Force would interpose itself between the two sides in order to prevent hostilities.

12. The civilian police monitors would also be deployed throughout the UNPAs. They would be unarmed. They would have no executive responsibility for the maintenance of public order but they would closely monitor the work of the local police forces. To this end, they would be co-located with police headquarters in each region and opstina and would accompany the local police on their patrols and in their performance of their other duties. They would investigate any complaints of discrimination or other abuse of human rights and would report to the Chief of the United Nations Force any confirmed cases of discrimination or abuse. They would require free and immediate access to all premises and facilities of, or under the control of, the local police forces.

13. The United Nations Force would also include a group of military observers. They would be unarmed, in accordance with normal United Nations practice. They would initially be deployed in the UNPAs to verify the demilitarization of those areas. As soon as demilitarization had been effected, the military observers would be transferred to parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina adjacent to Croatia. Their functions there would be to patrol extensively, to liaise with the local authorities and to warn the Chief of the United Nations Force if inter-communal tension threatened to disturb the peace and tranquillity established by the Force in the UNPAs. Their good offices would be available to help resolve local difficulties and to investigate allegations of inter-communal tension or aggression. The exact locations in which the military observers would operate would be decided by the advance party of the United Nations Force, after consulting local authorities. There would also be a small detachment of military observers at Dubrovnik.

14. The military and police personnel of the United Nations Force would arrive in Yugoslavia as soon as possible after the Security Council decided to establish the Force. They would be deployed simultaneously in all three UNPAs. The Force's assumption of responsibility for the protection of these areas would be synchronized with the demilitarization process. To this end, close coordination would be required with the commanders of the forces currently deployed in each of the UNPAs and agreed timetables would be established in order to link deployment of the United Nations Force with the demilitarization of each area.

Demilitarization of the UNPAs

15. On the basis of the agreed timetables, demilitarization of the UNPAs would be implemented as rapidly as possible, in the following way:

(a) All units and personnel of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and the Croatian National Guard, as well as any Territorial Defence units or personnel not based in the UNPAs, would be withdrawn from them;

(b) All Territorial Defence units and personnel based in the UNPAs would be disbanded and demobilized. Disbandment would involve the temporary

dissolution of the units' command structures. Demobilization would mean that the personnel involved would cease to wear any uniform or carry any weapons, though they could continue to be paid by the local authorities;

(c) The weapons of the Territorial Defence units and personnel based in the UNPAs would be handed over to units of JNA or the Croatian National Guard, as the case might be, before those units withdrew from the UNPAs. Alternatively, they could be handed over to the United Nations Force for safe custody during the interim period, if that arrangement was preferred by the units concerned;

(d) All paramilitary, irregular or volunteer units or personnel would either be withdrawn from the UNPAs or, if resident in them, be disbanded and demobilized.

16. It would be the responsibility of each unit, before it withdrew or was disbanded, to remove any mines which it had laid while deployed in the UNPAs.

17. The implementation of the above arrangements for demilitarization of the UNPAs would be verified by the United Nations Force.

Relocation of the Yugoslav National Army

18. In parallel with the assumption by the United Nations Force of its protective functions in the UNPAs, any JNA units deployed elsewhere in Croatia would be relocated to places outside that republic. A timetable for this relocation would be agreed between the Chief of the United Nations Force and the Federal Secretary for National Defence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. All Serbian territorial, paramilitary, irregular and volunteer units (other than those disbanded and demobilized in the UNPAs) would similarly withdraw from Croatia. These withdrawals would be verified by the military observers of the United Nations Force.

Local police forces

19. The maintenance of public order in the UNPAs would be the responsibility of local police forces who would carry only side-arms. Each of these forces would be formed from residents of the UNPA in question, in proportions reflecting the national composition of the population which lived in it before the recent hostilities. The local police forces would be responsible to the existing opstine councils in the UNPAs. Any existing regional police structures would remain in place, provided that they were consistent with the principle described above concerning the national composition of the local police forces.

Return of displaced persons to their homes

20. In accordance with established international principles, the United Nations policy is to facilitate the return to their homes of all persons displaced by the recent hostilities who so desire. The lead in this matter is being taken by the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations. If a United Nations Force were established in Yugoslavia, it would provide all appropriate support to this effort in the UNPAs. The United Nations police monitors would have an especially important role in this regard.

Organization of a United Nations Force

21. If a peace-keeping operation were established to carry out the above-described functions, it would be commanded by a civilian Chief of Mission who would receive his instructions from, and report to, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. As already stated, the Secretary-General would himself report regularly to the Security Council, whose guidance he would seek if any difficulties arose in implementation of the Force's mandate. Under the authority of the Chief of Mission, there would be a Force Commander, with the rank of Major General, who would command the military elements, and a Police Commissioner, who would command the civilian police monitors. The headquarters of the Force would be located at Banja Luka, with sub-offices at Belgrade and Zagreb.

22. To carry out the functions described above, the Force would require approximately 10 infantry battalions, 100 military observers and 500 police monitors, together with the necessary civilian and military support personnel. This would indicate a strength of somewhat over 10,000 persons.

Annex IV

Letter dated 10 December 1991 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands

I wish to share with you concerns which I have in regard to the situation in Yugoslavia.

These concerns have been deepened by the report that I have just received from my Personal Envoy, Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, who returned last evening from a fourth mission to Yugoslavia. They have also been deepened by the outcome of yesterday's informal meeting of the Presidents of the six Yugoslav republics, which Lord Carrington convened at The Hague in his capacity as Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia.

I shall shortly be reporting to the Security Council on the outcome of Mr. Vance's mission. As far as a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia is concerned, difficulties persist - owing to the fact that the Geneva agreement of 23 November is not being fully implemented. A paper comprising a concept and operational plan of a potential peace-keeping operation has, however, been left with the principal parties by Mr. Vance. It has met with a wide measure of agreement from them.

In his report to me today, Mr. Vance has described widely expressed apprehensions about the possibility of premature recognition of the independence of some of the Yugoslav republics and the effect that such a move might have on the remaining republics. Leaders of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia were among the many political and military figures who last week underscored to Mr. Vance their own strong fears in this regard. More than one of his high-level interlocutors described the possibly explosive consequences of such a development as being a "potential time bomb".

Given these anxieties, I believe that the Twelve were correct when they reiterated, at their special European Political Cooperation Ministerial Meeting held at Rome on 8 November, that the prospect of recognition of the independence of those republics wishing it, "can only be envisaged in the framework of an overall settlement ...". As we know, that overall settlement is being pursued by the Conference on Yugoslavia under the Chairmanship of Lord Carrington.

Let me be clear: I am not in any way calling into question the principle of self-determination which is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. However, I am deeply worried that any early, selective recognition could widen the present conflict and fuel an explosive situation especially in Bosnia-Hercegovina and also Macedonia; indeed, serious consequences could ensue for the entire Balkan region. I believe, therefore, that uncoordinated actions should be avoided.

I should be grateful if you could bring my concerns to the attention of your partners among the Twelve, given the particular responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

(Signed) Javier PEREZ DE CUELLAR

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23281
12 December 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Noting the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 30 November 1991 (S/23263 and Add.1),

Noting also the recommendation by the Secretary-General that the Security Council extend the stationing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months,

Noting further that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to keep the Force in Cyprus beyond 15 December 1991,

Reaffirming the provisions of resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and other relevant resolutions,

1. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force established under resolution 186 (1964) for a further period ending on 15 June 1992;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the present resolution by 31 May 1992;

3. Calls upon all the parties concerned to continue to cooperate with the Force on the basis of the present mandate.

91-48913 4054Z (E)

UNITED
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General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/46/768
S/23282
12 December 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-sixth session
Agenda item 73
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES AFFECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND OTHER ARABS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-sixth year

Letter dated 11 December 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that on the afternoon of Wednesday, 11 December 1991, the Israeli occupation authorities installed on the western wall of the Holy Al-Aqsa Mosque (Al-Buraq Wall) at least eight loudspeakers oriented in the direction of the Mosque and its courtyards. This constitutes an extremely grave violation of the sanctity of this Holy Place, a blatant provocation to the sentiments of Muslims, a desecration of the things they hold most sacred and open interference with the freedom of worship of congregants engaged in their religious observances.

The Jordanian Government would like to call attention to the serious character of this measure. It is being taken in the context of Israel's ongoing practices aimed at the obliteration of Islamic religious landmarks in the Holy City and their Judaization, which will have the same dire consequences as the incident that took place in the precinct of the Haram al-Sharif on 8 October 1990.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 73, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdullah SALAH
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/23283
12 December 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached communication which he has received from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Annex

Letter dated 11 December 1991 from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General

Please find attached the report of the eighth IAEA inspection in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). You may deem it appropriate to transmit the report to the members of the Security Council. I remain, of course, available with the Chief Inspector, Mr. Demetrius Perricos, for any consultations you or the Council may wish to have.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

Enclosure

REPORT ON THE EIGHTH IAEA ON-SITE INSPECTION IN IRAQ
UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991)

11 - 18 November 1991

SALIENT POINTS

- The in-field activities related to information on the procurement of equipment essential to the Iraqi nuclear programme continued despite persistent efforts by Iraq to conceal such information. Manufacturers of a number of specific equipment items were identified.

- The Iraqi authorities provided additional answers to questions about weaponization which had been put by the seventh IAEA inspection team and which related mainly to the results of initiator design work and tests, to work on flash X-ray systems, to the theoretical calculations and design options studied, and to the energy released. The answers were vague and general, especially as regards questions deriving from the secret PC-3 progress reports obtained during the sixth IAEA inspection.

- The Iraqi authorities repeated that they had never produced any quantities of 93%-enriched uranium and had never obtained any, other than those known to the Agency, and expressed their concern about the IAEA's findings. The matter is still under investigation.

- Systematic destruction of the EMIS double-pole magnets started, using thermal cutting equipment and with the co-operation of the Iraqi authorities. Basic equipment related to the EMIS and the centrifuge programme was destroyed or rendered harmless. Two high-speed streak video camera systems were removed from Iraq; they are now in storage on the premises of the IAEA.

All fresh highly enriched uranium of Soviet origin was shipped out of Iraq in two consignments, on 15 and 17 November, with the full co-operation of the Iraqi authorities. The airlifting operation was arranged through a contract between the USSR Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry and the IAEA. Only 400 g of 93%-enriched fresh uranium, in the form of 23 fuel plates, and the irradiated fuel elements of French and Soviet origin remain in Iraq.

The verification of nuclear material in the Tuwaitha area was completed, and only 16.7 tons of uranium in waste solutions stored in the Mosul area remain to be properly verified. During evaluation of the nuclear material balance, a number of discrepancies were identified; explanations and clarifications to be provided by the Iraqi authorities were requested in writing.

Monitoring activities initiated during the seventh inspection mission continued during the eighth. It is the opinion of the eighth inspection team that inspection efforts in Iraq should gradually shift to monitoring, with occasional identification and characterization activities performed when new information becomes available. For the time being, certain activities related to the destruction of equipment and removal of the irradiated highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel (including the 400 g of 93% enriched fresh uranium) should continue in parallel with monitoring inspections and follow-up activities.

INTRODUCTION

1. This report summarizes the findings of the eighth inspection carried out by the IAEA under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) with the assistance and co-operation of the Special Commission of the United Nations. The inspection took place from 11 to 18 November 1991 and was headed by Mr. Demetrius Perricos of the IAEA as Chief Inspector. The team consisted of 12 inspectors and 7 supporting staff; it comprised 16 nationalities.

The objectives of the inspection were broadly

- to continue field activities related to the foreign procurement by Iraq of equipment essential to its nuclear programme.

- to further investigate and assess the extent of the Iraqi weaponization studies.

- to continue the destruction or rendering harmless of enrichment- and reprocessing-related equipment.

- to prepare and supervise the removal from Iraq of the fresh HEU fuel of Soviet origin.

- to finalize the verification of nuclear material in the Al Tuwaitha area and perform nuclear material accountancy follow-up activities.

These broad objectives were assigned to two groups within the overall team, with a group leader responsible for co-ordinating the work of each group.

2. The inspection activities related to foreign procurement by Iraq which were initiated in a systematic manner during the seventh inspection mission continued. The inspection revealed new data on procurement and provided additional understanding of the Iraqi procurement strategy, which was based on the use of different State establishments as buyers and contractors, on direct procurement from manufacturers and on indirect procurement through foreign intermediaries. A number of manufacturers of equipment directly related to the programme were identified, but this does not necessarily mean that the manufacturers were also the suppliers.

3. In the area of weaponization, investigation and questioning continued. The Iraqi authorities provided some additional information regarding the design of the initiator and completed the answers to the questions put to them by the seventh team on 12 October 1991. The answers were vague and general, especially as regards questions deriving from the secret Iraqi progress reports obtained during the sixth inspection. Additional facilities were inspected at the Al Atheer site, some of them in depth for the first time. They provided additional evidence that Iraq was investing very substantial resources in a complete programme of weapons development studies.

4. Regarding the destruction of equipment directly related to Iraq's enrichment and reprocessing programmes, activities initiated during the seventh inspection were expanded, the emphasis being on equipment that had been used for the manufacturing of centrifuges or had been procured especially for the centrifuge programme. Destruction of the large double-pole magnets from the EMIS programme began.

5. In compliance with Security Council resolution 687, the fresh HEU fuel of Soviet origin, comprising 68 fuel assemblies of 80% enrichment and 10 of 36% enrichment, was removed from Iraq in two consignments. The Iraqi authorities co-operated fully during preparation of the shipment, the transfer from Tuwaitha to Habanniya airport and loading onto the plane. Confirmation has been received from the USSR Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry that all the fresh fuel arrived in the USSR and it is available for inspection in accordance with the terms of the contract with the IAEA.

6. The verification of nuclear material was completed. With the exception of approximately 16 tons of uranium in waste solutions stored in the Mosul area, the material has been brought together at locations in and around the Tuwaitha site and is now under Agency seals. During verification, a number of discrepancies were identified, related mainly to the balancing of nuclear material processed using Brazilian UO_2 as feed.

7. Table I summarizes the chronology of 1991 events related to IAEA activities under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). With the completion of the eighth inspection, all known facilities and sites involved in enrichment and weaponization in Iraq have been inspected. However, owing to the unresolved inconsistencies and ambiguities in statements made by the Iraqi authorities, no assurance can be given that the full

extent of the Iraqi programme has been revealed. It is the opinion of the eighth team that inspection efforts in Iraq should gradually shift to monitoring, with occasional identification and characterization activities performed when new information becomes available. For the time being, certain activities related to the destruction of equipment and removal of the irradiated HEU fuel (including the 400 g of 93%-enriched fresh uranium) should continue with monitoring inspections and follow-up activities.

A full record of the correspondence between the Chief Inspector and the Iraqi counterpart while the eighth IAEA inspection team was in Iraq is given in Annex 1.

TABLE 1

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
1991

APRIL 03 1991	UNSC RESOLUTION 687
APRIL 06 1991	IRAQ FORMALLY ACCEPTS CONDITIONS OF UNSC 687
APRIL 18 1991	IRAQ SUBMITS FIRST DECLARATION; DENIES HAVING NUCLEAR-WEAPONS-USABLE MATERIAL
APRIL 27 1991	IRAQ SUBMITS SECOND DECLARATION; FIRST ADMISSION TO HAVING SOME NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND FACILITIES IN ADDITION TO THOSE KNOWN TO THE AGENCY
MAY 14-22 1991	FIRST INSPECTION UNDER UNSC 687; FIRST IAEA TEAM INSPECTS DECLARED IRAQI FACILITIES AND THE TARMIYA SITE
JUNE 17 1991	UNSC RESOLUTION 699, APPROVING IAEA PLAN FOR THE DESTRUCTION, REMOVAL OR RENDERING HARMLESS OF THE ITEMS SPECIFIED IN PARA. 12 OF UNSC 687
JUNE 22-JULY 03 1991	SECOND IAEA INSPECTION OF IRAQI FACILITIES; ACCESS DENIED AT VARIOUS SITES, IN ONE CASE USING WARNING SHOTS
JULY 04 1991	HIGH-LEVEL UN MISSION REPORTS THAT IRAQI RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ACCESS BY INSPECTION TEAM ON JUNE 28 WAS LESS THAN WHAT WAS CALLED FOR BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL
JULY 07-18 1991	THIRD IAEA INSPECTION OF IRAQI FACILITIES
JULY 07 1991	IRAQ SUBMITS THIRD DECLARATION ON ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAMME IN LETTER TO SECURITY COUNCIL, MAINTAINING THAT IRAQ HAD COMPLIED WITH NPT AND IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEEMENT; DISCLOSED THREE METHODS OF ENRICHMENT: CENTRIFUGE, CHEMICAL AND ELECTROMAGNETIC
JULY 14 1991	IRAQ SUBMITS ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATION ON ITS THIRD DECLARATION AND PROVIDES LIST OF MANUFACTURING FACILITIES RELATED TO ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAMME
JULY 25 1991	DEADLINE FOR IRAQI DECLARATION OF ALL REMAINING NUCLEAR SITES
JULY 28 1991	IRAQ SUMBITS ADDITIONAL LIST OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

JULY 27 - AUGUST 10 1991	FOURTH IAEA INSPECTION OF IRAQI FACILITIES, INCLUDING THE AL FURAT SITE INTENDED FOR PRODUCTION OF CENTRIFUGES, AND THE AL JESIRA PLANT, INTENDED FOR PRODUCTION OF FEED MATERIAL
AUGUST 15 1991	UNSC RESOLUTION 707 WHICH OBLIGES IRAQ, INTER ALIA, TO "HALT ALL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES OF ANY KIND, EXCEPT FOR USE OF ISOTOPES FOR MEDICAL, AGRICULTURAL OR INDIVIDUAL PURPOSES" UNTIL THE SPECIAL COMMISSION DETERMINES THAT IRAQ IS IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH UNSC 707 AND PARAS. 12 AND 13 OF UNSC 687 AND THE IAEA DETERMINES THAT IRAQ IS IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH ITS SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE AGENCY
SEPTEMBER 14 - 20 1991	FIFTH IAEA INSPECTION OF IRAQI FACILITIES MAIN EMPHASIS ON VERIFICATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND REMOVAL OF THE PRODUCED PLUTONIUM AND INVESTIGATION OF THE CHEMICAL ENRICHMENT PROCESS
SEPTEMBER 22-30 1991	SIXTH IAEA INSPECTION OF IRAQI FACILITIES CONTAINING DOCUMENTATION ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT
SEPTEMBER 24-28 1991	SIXTH IAEA INSPECTION TEAM DETAINED BY IRAQI AUTHORITIES IN PARKING LOT OF PETROCHEMICAL 3 HEADQUARTERS, BAGHDAD
OCTOBER 11 1991	UNSC RESOLUTION 715, APPROVING IAEA PLAN FOR ON-GOING MONITORING OF IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH RESOLUTIONS 687 AND 707
OCTOBER 11-21 1991	SEVENTH IAEA INSPECTION OF IRAQI FACILITIES START OF DESTRUCTION OF ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING RELATED EQUIPMENT
OCTOBER 14 1991	IRAQ ACKNOWLEDGES THAT RESEARCH AND STUDIES HAD BEEN UNDER WAY IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR WEAPONIZATION
OCTOBER 21 1991	IRAQ ADMITS THAT THE AL ATHEER SITE WAS BUILT TO SERVE THE WEAPONIZATION PROGRAMME IN ADDITION TO ITS USE AS A MATERIALS PRODUCTION SITE.
NOVEMBER 11-18 1991	EIGHTH IAEA INSPECTION OF IRAQI FACILITIES - ACTIVITIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EQUIPMENT RELATED TO CENTRIFUGE AND CHEMICAL ENRICHMENT - INITIATION OF SYSTEMATIC DESTRUCTION OF LARGE DOUBLE-POLE MAGNETS RELATED TO EMIS - IN-FIELD ACTIVITIES RELATED TO PROCUREMENT OF EQUIPMENT
NOVEMBER 15 + 17 1991	SHIPMENT FROM IRAQ OF FRESH HEU OF SOVIET ORIGIN

FOREIGN SUPPLIES TO THE IRAQI NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

8. The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission had, in support of its uranium enrichment and planned weaponization efforts, established a large, secure and highly successful procurement network. The procurement strategy included:

- The use of other Iraqi State establishments as buyers and contractors;

- The placing of orders for equipment (especially manufactured components) directly with foreign manufacturers and indirectly through foreign intermediaries (multiple pieces of some equipment were obtained both directly and indirectly); and

- The utilization of indigenous capabilities to complete the manufacture of some items.

The Iraqi authorities have gone - and are still going to great lengths to prevent the discovery of procurement data. Most procurement-related information has been removed and presumably destroyed.

The large amount of information regarding the Petrochemical-3 (PC-3) project collected during the sixth inspection is still in the process of being translated and evaluated. So far, it appears to include only limited procurement data. Manufacturer name tags have been removed from individual pieces of equipment, and forms of identification such as serial numbers have been filed away. This process is continuing: procurement data on a particular piece of equipment discovered during the seventh inspection were painted over during the interval between the seventh and eighth inspections.

9. The Iraqi authorities now freely acknowledge a political decision calling for efforts to prevent disclosure of the procurement network. They recognize that their efforts have not been entirely successful and that the inspection teams have collected enough information to be able eventually to put the pieces together. Their stated motivation is to protect the relationships with their various suppliers.

10. The casting and rough machining of large iron components for the EMIS programme was done at foundries outside Iraq. The acquisition of these pieces provides a good example of the Iraqi procurement strategy. A large west European foundry received an order from the Iraqi State Electric Establishment for six pieces as shown in Figure 1 (drawing was provided to the IAEA Action Team by the foundry's management). The pieces were produced at the foundry and shipped directly to Iraq. At about the same time, the foundry received an order from a European company for 28 large iron pieces; six of them had specifications identical to those of the pieces produced for the Iraqi State Electric Establishment; twelve of them were halves - along the horizontal axis - of the pieces depicted in Figure 1. These pieces were, in the team's opinion, pre-machined cores for the 1200 mm double-pole magnets installed or destined for installation at Tarmiya. Final machining was done at Al Radwan (Aqba bin Nafi State Establishment) to specifications depicted in Figure 2 (solid core) and Figure 3 ("sandwich" core); the drawings in Figures 2 and 3 were obtained in Iraq. The remaining ten pieces were various parts of the horizontal and vertical return irons for the 1200 mm system. The foundry shipped the components to a seaport in Germany, where they were redirected to their final destination.

11. The foundry's management has indicated that they would have received a larger order from what has turned out to be an intermediary company if they could have met the required production schedule. This, together with the numbers of pieces seen in Iraq, suggests that one or more additional contracts must have been placed with other foundries. The investigation of this matter is continuing.

12. Iraqi officials have described the EMIS component machining work done at the Al Radwan facility as having been carried out under conditions of great secrecy: people simply showed up with components/specifications and removed everything when the work had been completed; they had no idea of what the equipment was for or the identity of the customer. Managers of various Iraqi firms involved in manufacturing aspect of the EMIS programme tell a similar story.

13. A large number of the centrifuge components described in the report of the seventh inspection team, were also obtained from foreign sources. Examples of all major components (rotor tubes, end caps, pin bearings, etc.) removed from Iraq by the third and seventh inspection teams have been and are currently being examined in order to identify the manufacturers. This investigation is vital for follow-up activities to determine the completeness of Iraqi declarations, particularly those relating to carbon fiber rotors.



FIGURE 1: CROSS SECTION OF PRE-MACHINED CORE FOR 1200 MM DOUBLE POLE MAGNETS



FIGURE 2: CROSS SECTION OF CORE FOR 1200 MM DOUBLE POLE MAGNET MACHINED TO FINAL DIMENSIONS



FIGURE 3: CROSS SECTION OF CORE FOR "SANDWICHED" 1200 MM DOUBLE POLE MAGNET MACHINED TO FINAL DIMENSIONS

14. The manufacturers of most equipment used or intended for use in Iraqi efforts to establish a centrifuge production and operation capability have been firmly identified. A summary of some of the more important equipment follows:

- A flow forming machine with application-specific mandrel, expanding mandrel and rollers was manufactured by H & H Metallform Maschinenbau und Vertriebs GmbH.
- An electron beam welder with a special fixture for holding the rotor tube during welding was manufactured by Leybold Heraeus AG.
- Three large CNC machines, two with application-specific fixtures, were manufactured by Neue Magdeburger Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik GmbH.
- A large oxidation furnace with special temperature control features was manufactured by Degussa.
- High frequency converters capable of operating a large number of centrifuges were produced by Acomel GmbH & Co KG.
- Horizontal and vertical balancing machines were manufactured by Dr. Reutlinger & Söhne KG.
- Hand operated, pneumatic and electrically controlled bellows valves were manufactured by NUPRO, VAT AG and Balzer AG respectively.
- Quantities of Krytox, a nuclear grade fluorinated vacuum pump oil were manufactured by Dupont.

Identification of a manufacturer does not necessarily mean identification of the supplier. As pointed out earlier, orders were often placed with manufacturers through intermediaries; this appears to have been the case with at least one of the Magdeburger CNC machines - and a shipping invoice discovered by the inspection team inside the packing crate for a large oxidation furnace appears to provide the name of an intermediary for that procurement.

15. Much of the equipment listed above is multi-purpose in the sense of being useful in a number of manufacturing processes. However, the application-specific fixtures remove most doubt as to the intended uses. Some of the companies may not have been aware that Iraq was the final customer, but the intermediaries certainly were -

and they must have known (or could reasonably have inferred) the intended uses. The large iron pieces destined for the EMIS programme are a different matter: the foundry(ies) may have known that Iraq was the customer, but the iron pieces prior to final machining provided no clue as to their intended use.

Additional procurement-related data are in the possession of the IAEA. This information is being treated as confidential at present since premature disclosure could compromise the ongoing investigation.

16. The manufacturers of large quantities of general-purpose and infrastructure equipment located at Al Tuwaitha, Tarmiya, Ash Sharqat and Al Atheer have been identified. Concerning this equipment, the plan is that follow-up will be limited to instances where the manufacturer appears also to have provided specific services to one or more of these facilities. Most of the equipment at Al Atheer is consistent with the Iraqi declaration that Al Atheer was intended to be a material sciences research centre. Among the exceptions is a large cold isostatic press manufactured by Asea Brown Boveri (which could be used for shaping explosive charges) and very high temperature furnaces (e.g. vacuum-induction furnaces) manufactured by Arthur Pfeiffer Vakuum Technik GmbH. A large number of smear samples from Al Atheer equipment were taken in order to further evaluate the Iraqi declaration that this facility was never used for weapons-related research.

17. The eighth inspection team removed two streak video cameras and related equipment from Iraq. These cameras, manufactured by Hamamatsu, have sufficient speed and resolution for weaponization work. At the time of their removal, they were being used by the Technical University of Baghdad. According to Iraqi authorities, their use was limited to graduate student studies of internal combustion engines; they were never employed in Iraq's weaponization programme. Statements regarding the planned use of the cameras made to the manufacturers at the time of procurement are consistent with declarations made to the inspection team. Smear samples from the cameras may provide further evidence regarding their use.

ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE WEAPONIZATION PROGRAMME

18. On 12 November 1991, the Iraqi authorities provided answers to weaponization questions which had been put by the seventh inspection team on 21 October 1991 -

the last day of its mission - and which related mainly to design studies (including initiator design studies, tamper interface, core and energy release calculations, detonators, hydrodynamic tests, flash X-ray systems and lithium enrichment studies. The answers provided were vague and general, especially as regards questions deriving from the secret PC-3 progress reports obtained during the sixth IAEA inspection.

19. The inspection team requested further information about research or studies on a gun-type weapon design and specific values used in calculations of the design explosion energy and received the following answer:

> "The researched literature indicates that the "Gun" type need more material although the design idea is simpler and the calculation requirements are less. Therefore, the study of this literature led us (Iraq) to concentrate on understanding the implosion type mechanics.
>
> The literature quoted a yield of 20 KT as an approximate figure for the energy released from the implosion device used in Nagasaki. In the calculation models the yield depends on several parameters including the pressure applied on the outer surface, its pulse width, and the device dimensions. Theoretically different yields starting from 1 KT could result depending on these parameters. Since predetermined values for these parameters were not available, a study was performed to determine its effect using one dimensional integrated code and not two dimensional."

20. The inspection team requested information (descriptions and an indication of precise locations) of the mainframe computers which had been used or intended for use at Al Tuwaitha and elsewhere in Iraq in pursuit of the PC-3 programme's objectives (and meeting the Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat requirements). The Iraqi answer was as follows:

> "The Computer Office at Tarmiya was initially designed to accommodate the option of a large computer (mainframe). Due to the special circumstances in operating individual separators, it was discovered through experience that the best condition would be to connect the separators to small dedicated computers. After achieving the steady operating conditions for the separators, the small computers would have been connected through a network located in the above-mentioned office. This approach was adopted at Tarmiya. It also applies to the design of the Computer Office at Ash-Sharqat, although computers were never introduced at this site.
>
> At the Al Tuwaitha site, the large computer was an IBM-370; in addition there were a number of personal computers (PCs) including IBM PS/2. The approach adopted at Al Tuwaitha was to use the computer capability available in the country when needed in addition to the above-mentioned computers.".

This answer is not complete and not compatible with a statement in the PC-3 progress report for the period 1 July - 16 November 1989 which indicates that a mainframe NEC

750 computer was used to run a program obtained from the literature which solves hydrodynamic equations in one-dimensional space and in the presence of a shock wave.

21. In reply to the team's question about the scope of the lithium enrichment programme, the Iraqi authorities stated that the studies had not been directed towards a specific objective and that the Li^6 separation activities belonged to the area of general scientific research, with no specific production rate envisaged. The Iraqi reports on this topic were classified secret. Their explanation for the secret classification was that "the outside world would not have understood why they were working on lithium and they were afraid that they would have been severely criticized for undertaking this programme".

22. The inspection team indicated to the Iraqi authorities that it had documentary evidence of several attempts by Iraq to obtain a uranium standard (NBS U930) enriched to 93% in U235. Although these attempts were acknowledged, the fifth and seventh inspection teams had been told that they had not been successful. The inspection team questioned the intended purpose of such a standard, given the lower declared enrichments achieved in the Iraqi enrichment programme, and requested further explanations in view of the persistent appearance of uranium with 93% enrichment in environmental samples collected at and near Al Tuwaitha. The Iraqi authorities stated - as they had on 14 October 1991 - that they had never produced or obtained any quantities (even small ones) of 93%-enriched uranium other than the Tamuz-2 reactor fuel. They indicated their "surprise and worry that such material appeared in the collected samples from the sites" and expressed their willingness to discuss and follow up this matter. The Iraqi side expressed the fear that the sample data are a result of deliberate sabotage by a disgruntled citizen or foreign enemy. This is highly unlikely given the history of sample collection and analysis. The inspection team took additional samples for further analysis. This matter is still under investigation.

Activities at the Al Atheer site

23. In a letter of 14 October 1991 to the seventh IAEA inspection team, the Al Atheer site was declared to be a national centre for research in material science and materials production which provided a missing link in Iraqi industry and technology. The declaration disclosed, however, that the design requirements for the buildings met the needs of a weapons programme, if a decision to launch such a programme were to

be taken in the future. The individual identified as the leader of the nuclear weapons investigation programme was also on the Al Atheer Site Advisory Committee.

24. The task of the eighth inspection team at this site was to complete the site examination by visiting buildings which have not been inspected by earlier teams, to identify and photograph process equipment and analytical instruments, and to interview the staff in the light of earlier discussions and new declarations.

25. Among the buildings visited by the team (see Figure 4) were the Polymer Laboratories (Building 84), the Materials Characterization Building (Building 85), the Internal Explosion Test Laboratory (Building 18) and the associated control building (Buildings 19), the laboratories stated to belong to the Hatteen Establishment (Building 21), the manufacturing workshop (Building 41), the maintenance workshop (Building 40) and warehouses (Buildings 53, 54 and 56), and the High Explosives Test Firing Bunker (Building 33, designated by Iraq as Site 100).

26. The Iraqi management declared that Building 18 was an explosive chamber to be used for the study of the fragmentation of mortar shells up to 155 mm. This explanation does not make sense. Although no final judgement can be made at present about the intended use of this building, in the opinion of the eighth team this multi-million dollar facility was certainly not meant for the fragmentation testing of mortar shells. Further investigations are needed in order to determine the intended use of Buildings 18 and 19, which appear to have been related.

27. The Polymer Laboratories (Building 84) were a large complex about 50% complete. The stated purpose of the building was polymer and plastic development for petrochemical projects. Since construction was in a very early stage, it is not possible to confirm or deny the statement.

28. The warehouses (Buildings 53, 54 and 56) had extensive ventilation and cooling - to prevent chemical hazards due to high temperatures during the summer - and fire detection/suppression (Halon) systems.

29. The Iraqi management have declared that the Carbide Building (Building 55) is for the production of tungsten carbide (100 t/a). The Al Atheer staff indicated that the main customer was to be the Bader plant, as they were planning to produce carbide tools and dyes for industry. Since a lot of the necessary equipment has not been delivered because of the embargo, they are currently considering alternative uses, such as the production of ceramic materials. IAEA inspection teams have pointed out some insufficiencies with regard to hydrogen safety for such a plant, but explanations are

FIGURE 4


AL-ATHEER
59-61. Caravans and Cable Housing
68. Offices
82. Powder Technology Laboratories
84. Polymer Laboratories
55. Carbide Building
85. QC Laboratories
50. Metallurgy Laboratories
85. Offices
33. HE Test Site (Hatteen)
14. QC Laboratories
56. Warehouse
18. Bunker
54. Warehouse
19. Internal Explosion Test Laboratory
53. Warehouse
39. Electric Workshop
40. Maintenance Workshop
21. Laboratories (Hatteen)
41. Manufacturing Workshop
42. Welding Workshop
New Storage (Hatteen)

/...

still expected. The Al Atheer staff claimed that the tungsten carbide production was not linked to the PC-3 project, but there is documentary evidence that the two were linked.

30. The Iraqi side now refer to the IAEA Building 33 firing bunker as Site 100. They describe this as a Hatteen facility but Site 100 is mentioned several times in the PC-3 progress reports. Plans for Al Atheer development to make it suitable for weaponization studies must have included Site 100. The Iraqi side has persistently denied that any improvement or repair work has been done at this site since it was bombed even though the inspection team has unequivocal evidence to the contrary. The damage to the bunker is repairable.

31. According to the PC-3 progress report covering the period 1 January - 31 May 1990, the Al Atheer site was opened in May 1990. The inspection teams have taken samples to determine whether equipment and facilities were used for weaponization-related research; the sample analysis results are not yet available. Equipment such as isostatic presses and high-temperature furnaces have been identified and placed under IAEA seal. Action is being taken the determine - with the help of the manufacturers - the delivery dates and the number of equipment items and accessories supplied to Iraq. This information and the analytical results will be used in determining whether the site ever started operations.

DESTRUCTION OF EQUIPMENT/COMPONENTS

32. Activities, begun during the seventh inspection, to destroy or render harmless equipment/components associated with the Iraqi uranium enrichment programme continued during the eighth inspection. The Iraqi authorities, anxious to salvage what they can, made a number of suggestions as to how specific equipment could be rendered useless for enrichment applications and still be available for other uses (with appropriate monitoring). In some cases, the suggestions were accepted for further evaluation; in other cases, they were not and an immediate decision to destroy was taken. The centrifuge-related equipment destroyed during the eighth inspection included:

- Three large high-frequency converters stored at the Ash Shakyli warehouse;
- A vertical balancing machine and the bed for the horizontal balancing machine;
- The jig for a MIG (Metal Inert Gas) welder specially designed for welding aluminium centrifuge casings;

- A mandrel, the expanding mandrel and roller bearings used in the flow forming manufacture of maraging steel rotor tubes (the holding collar of the mandrel was removed from Iraq for further evaluation of the extent of use);

- An electron beam welder fixture designed to hold maraging steel rotors while the end caps are being welded on;

- A rotating spindle and mandrel for the CNC machine used to cut maraging steel rotor tubes to length, and the special collet and whirling head from the CNC machine used to manufacture molecular pumps.

33. The destruction of the application-specific fixtures associated with the centrifuge manufacturing equipment has rendered this equipment useless for centrifuge applications. However, uncertainty remains regarding the completeness of Iraqi declarations as to the number of machine-tools of various types existing in Iraq. Follow-up investigations with equipment manufacturers and suppliers may help. The remaining equipment has not been released for use; it is under Agency seal pending a final decision.

34. At the conclusion of the seventh inspection, the destruction of EMIS components stored at Al Nafad was complete except for the large iron cores of the double-pole magnets and a number of machined parts of the vertical return iron. Several attempts to destroy these pieces were unsuccessful. The solution found was high-temperature cutting fueled by large amounts of oxygen. Destruction of the magnet cores by three 1-1.5 meter long cuts through each has started; will require several weeks since this is a slow process. By the end of the inspection, eight cores had been destroyed. The Iraqi side, which co-operated fully, will continue this work and it is expected that all components will have been destroyed by the time the next IAEA team arrives.

35. Equipment that had been used in Iraqi chemical separation work was destroyed. The mixer-settlers in Building 9 at Al Tuwaitha, which had been used in reprocessing research, were destroyed by filling the mixer and settler chambers with Araldite. This was a difficult task because of the high level of radioactive contamination. A number of hot cells were rendered harmless, at least for the time being, by the cutting and removal of manipulators. The manipulator parts are under seal in a central location.

NUCLEAR MATERIAL VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES

Location C, Buildings 1 and 2 (Nuclear Material Storage)

36. The decision was taken to verify the nuclear material on the basis of a random sampling plan with a 90% confidence level and a goal quantity corresponding to 1 ton of uranium. The verification activities were completed during the eighth inspection and are summarized in Table 2. Only 16.7 tons of uranium contained in waste and stored in a petrol tank in the Mosul area remain to be properly verified. During compilation of the nuclear material balance, a number of discrepancies were identified; the Iraqi authorities were requested, in writing, to provide explanation and clarification in due course. Details of the verification and the discrepancies are given in Annex 2.

REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL FROM IRAQ

37. Representatives of the USSR Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry and staff of the IAEA, with the help of the Iraqi counterparts, made all the preparations necessary for the shipments, packing all Soviet-made fuel assemblies into the original drums and sealing them. The 23 plates of a Tamuz-2 fuel assembly were placed in a drum, which was sealed pending future removal. To comply with IAEA nuclear safety requirements, the material to be removed from Iraq was taken to Habanniya in two convoys of special trucks and flown out in two shipments. The first consignment consisted of six drums, each containing seven fuel assemblies (80% enrichment); the second consisted of five drums, one containing ten fuel assemblies (36% enrichment). Two Soviet AN-12 cargo planes arrived at Habanniya airport on 15 and 17 November. The drums were placed in special Soviet-constructed overpacks designed to fulfill the more stringent requirements formulated in the latest IAEA transport regulation. At present, the only remaining nuclear material stored at Location A are 23 MTR plates (400 g uranium, 372 g U235).

TABLE 2

Summary of Inspection Results

MATERIAL TYPE		ORIGIN Processing Site	PRESENTED TO TEAM NO.	DECLARED INVENTORY			VERIFIED INVENTORY				LEFT UNDER SEAL Y/N
				No. of Items	COMPOUND Weight (kg)	ELEMENT Weight (kg)	VERIFICATION I	NDA	B	D	
NATURAL URANIUM	Yellow Cake	Niger	1,3,8	858	276844	199934	858	329	122	41	Y
		Portugal	1,3	916	286435	213016	915	322	127	48	Y
		Al-Qaim	3	12	3000	2200	12	12	12	5	Y
	UO_2 Pellets	Previous Safeguards	4	47		14	1	1	1	1	Y
	U_3O_8 Powders		1,3			1162	10	6	3	3	Y
	UO_3 Powders		1				22	18	7	3	Y
	UO_4 Powders		1				1	1	1	1	Y
	Mx U Oxides		1				6	6	3	2	Y
	UO_4 Slurry		4				8	8	8	2	Y
	UO_4 Filters		4	37	100		37			1	Y
	UO_2 Powders	Brazil	3,4	227	22578		227	48	227	10	Y
	U Metal	Brazil/Al.T.Bld #10	4	22	1000	1000	22	7	22	3	Y
	Liquid Waste	Brazil/Al.T.Bld #15	4	4		6	4			1	Y
	UF_6	Brazil/Al.T.Bld #15	3	1	0.465		1	1	1	1	Y
	UF_4 Powders	Brazil/Al.T. Bld #15	1,3,4	5	379		3	3	3	6	Y
	UO_2 Powders						1		1	2	Y
	Mixed U Pdrs						1		1	6	Y
	UCl_4	Brzl./Al.T. Bld #85	3,4	43	1520		43	41	43	10	Y

I = item counting, B = weighing, D = sample analysis, NDA = non-destructive analysis

TABLE 2

Summary of Inspection Results

MATERIAL TYPE		ORIGIN Processing Site	PRESENTED TO TEAM NO.	DECLARED INVENTORY			VERIFIED INVENTORY				LEFT UNDER SEAL Y/N
				No. of Items	COMPOUND Weight (kg)	ELEMENT Weight (kg)	VERIFICATION				
							I	NDA	B	D	
NATU	ADU Powders	Brazil/Al.T. Bld #85	3	31	1850		11	11	11	12	Y
	ADU Scrap						4	4	4	5	
	UO_3 Powders						2		2	2	
	U_3O_8 Powders						1		1	1	
EU	Liquid Recovered	Brazil/Al.T. Bld #85	3	2		1.015	2		2	29	Y
DU						11.55					
NU						0.78					
NATURAL URANIUM	ADU Powders	Al-Qaim/Al-Jesira	4	3	220		3	3	3	4	Y
	UO_4 Powders		3	2			2	1	2	4	Y
				9	2255	1533	9	9	9	3	
	U_3O_8 Powders		4	4	100	84	4	4	4	1	Y
	UCl_4		3	8	1207	780	8	8	8	3	Y
	UO_3 Powders		3	44	2050	1640	8	8	8	10	Y
	UO_2 Powders						2	2	2	1	Y
	Mx U Oxides						19	19	19	2	Y
	UO_2 Powders		3	409	96967	84446	409	307	97	46	Y
	Scrap	Al-Tuwaitha	3	1			1		1	1	Y

I = item counting, B = weighing, D = sample and analysis, NDA = non-destructive analysis

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OTHER ACTIVITIES

Inspection at Tarmiya

38. An inspection of the Tarmiya EMIS site took place in order to:

- Take verification samples from the uranyl nitrate solutions stored in tanks in Building 62 (at the time of the third inspection, these solutions were in plastic containers buried in a field adjacent to the Tarmiya site; the solutions have been moved back to the storage tanks at the request of the inspection team);
- Assess the condition of and take samples from the mixer-settlers in Building 57;
- Place an identifying seal on the Delta precision measuring device installed in Building 271; and
- Monitor the clean-up of Tarmiya buildings and identify any new uses.

39. Samples were taken from the most highly enriched uranyl nitrate solution (5-10% U235) and most depleted (~.1% U235). The container with the 5-10% solution was sealed. The mixer-settlers in Building 57 had been moved to Al Tuwaitha; the reasons given for the move are vague and this matter should be followed-up. The Delta measuring device has been dismantled and placed in crates, which are now being stored in the room where the device had been installed; the Iraqi side indicated that this was done because of the poor environment and that the device would not be removed without prior consultation with an inspection team.

40. The overall level of activity at the Tarmiya site appears to be modest. There has been little change since the third inspection, in July. Building 245 is now being used for the manufacture and repair of transformers.

Inspection at the Badr State Establishment

41. The Badr State Establishment was one of the partners (with Daura) in the development of the Al Furat centrifuge manufacturing and testing facility. Besides the organizational connection, ten of the 13 CNC machines known to have been associated with the development of Iraq's centrifuge manufacturing capability are stored here (Building 24). These machines had been inspected previously and identifying seals had been placed on each machine during the seventh inspection. The purpose of the 14 November visit was to check the seals and search for additional supplier information.

42. A seal on one of the machines was found to have a broken wire; the Iraqi side could offer no explanation. The seal was replaced. The remaining seals were intact. The manufacturers of the machine components were noted, but most of the components are of general use. One exception may be the main spindle drive. Information on the manufacturer of the main spindle drive had been stripped from the drive housing of every machine but one. This information was recorded.

Inspection at the Aqba bin Nafi State Establishment

43. The Aqba bin Nafi State Establishment consists of general mechanical and engineering workshops at three locations - Al Ameen at Badr, Al Radwan near Khandri and Al Amir at Al Fallujah. The headquarters of the Establishment is at Al Ameen, within the boundaries of the Badr plant.

44. Prior to the Gulf War, the Al Ameen portion of the Aqba bin Nafi State Establishment had three primary functions:

- The assembling of CNC machine tools;
- The maintenance of T-72 tanks and the construction of parts for their repair; and
- The manufacture of parts for hydroelectric power stations.

The assembling of CNC machine tools was carried out under licence from a west European company. About 5-6% of the parts were manufactured at Al Ameen and the rest were imported. The control panels were manufactured at the Salladine Establishment, which was inspected by the seventh team.

45. The Establishment is still assembling CNC machines. The Iraqi management indicated that the contracts for tank maintenance and repair and the manufacture of hydroelectric power station parts have been cancelled. Work for the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission was apparently done only at the Al Radwan and Al Amir facilities. The Director of the Establishment described the conduct of the work in much the same terms as the Director of the Salladine Establishment - i.e. people showed up with plans and materials, they did not identify themselves, and they removed the plans and product when the work had been done.

46. The facilities appear consistent with Iraqi statements. Modest damage was sustained during the war, but most of it seems to have been repaired. The facilities include large, modern cleaning and welding shops. The welding shop is dominated by a huge electron beam welder with a chamber approximately 10 meters on a side. All equipment looked as though it had been in place for quite some time.

Sampling at Al Tuwaitha buildings

47. The seventh inspection team had received a request from the Iraqi side for permission to demolish a number of Al Tuwaitha buildings that had been severely damaged during the war - Buildings 9, 15, 55, 60, 64, 72, 73 and 74 and the Annex to Building 15. Permission was given by the IAEA after consultation with the Special Commission. The inspection team visited each of these buildings, to which access is limited because of severe damage, in order to collect additional samples (24 samples, a combination of smears and environmental samples, were taken). A number of other samples, unrelated to the demolition request, were taken at Location C and in Building 86.

Short-notice inspection

The "Al-Amil" Liquid Nitrogen Plant

48. Information collected during the sixth inspection revealed the existence of a plant named "project 7307", built in 1988-89, to provide liquid nitrogen for the EMIS diffusion pumps at Tarmiya. This plant, also called "Al Amil", was the subject of a short-notice inspection on 17 November 1991 following designation by the Special Commisssion. The team was accompanied by the plant manager during the inspection.

49. The Al Amil facility, located about six kilometers west of Tarmiya is a small, single-purpose and apparently well-run facility for - as indicated - the production of liquid nitrogen. With the destruction of Tarmiya and the cessation of the Iraqi EMIS programme, other customers for the liquid nitrogen were found and production continued unabated. There are plans to expand the capacity of this facility. Substantial amounts of used equipment have been brought to this location from one or more other sites and are being stored pending installation. The Al Amil facility was constructed with the help of a foreign firm.

The Karkh water treatment plant

50. The Karkh water treatment plant borders on the Al Amil liquid nitrogen facility and was covered by the same short-notice inspection designation. The Karkh plant was built to expand and improve the water supply to Baghdad. It was essentially complete at the time of the Gulf War, when the remaining contractor personnel left Iraq. A number of foreign firms were involved, the general contractor being Continental Construction Limited (India). The plant manager described the construction work as a 1.5 billion dollar project resulting in the largest water purification plant in the Middle East and one of the largest in the world. The capacity is about 2 million gallons of water/day.

51. The Karkh water treatment plant is well constructed and laid out, with a number of indications of a well-run facility (e.g. attention to industrial safety practices). All major buildings were inspected. None of the buildings showed any sign of functional change or of recent modification to utilities or ventilation systems. Nothing that might indicate a connection with the Iraqi nuclear programme was observed. There are some temporary structures at the site which, according to Iraqi statements, belong to the various contractors. They were inspected and the contents found to be consistent with the stated purpose. The plant manager indicated that the buildings and their contents would be disposed of upon return of the contractors.

Inspection at Al Qa Qaa

52. The six bunkers containing 255 tons of HMX high explosive were visited. The seals on the bunkers were checked and verified by seal replacement.

ANNEX 1

LIST OF REQUESTS SUBMITTED AND DECLARATIONS RECEIVED DURING THE 8TH IAEA INSPECTION

8-1. Mr. Al Hajjaj to Mr. Perricos on 911112 - response to the letter of 911021 providing information on the weaponization studies, hydrodynamic calculations made, Li-6 laboratory experiments, exploding wire laboratory studies, energy sources, initial tests of initiators, and studies on flash X-ray systems.

8-2. Mr. Al Hajjaj to Mr. Perricos on 911112 - response to the letter of 911021 providing information about equipment ordered for Powder technology laboratory, Ceramic slip casting laboratory, Sample preparation laboratory, and Casting building at Al Atheer. The letter includes some technical specifications of the equipment.

8-3. Mr. Al Hajjaj to Mr. Perricos on 911112 - response to the letter of 911021 providing information about the tests performed by PC-3 at Hatteen HE Test bunker site in Al Atheer during the period of March - May 1990.

8-4. Mr. Al Hajjaj to Mr. Perricos on 911112 - response to the letter of 911021 providing information about the design and completion of the Ash Sharqat site.

8-5. Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 911112 - acknowledging the receipt of U-233 and neptunium samples.

8-6. Mr. Zifferero to Ambassador Alkital on 911113 - regarding the levelling of certain buildings at Al Tuwaitha.

8-7. Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 911114 - requesting information about the location and quantities of bismuth used for the Po^{210} production, list of graphite machining equipment moved to the Al Rabie Plant, removal of the streak video system, the location of EMIS ion sources and collectors of building 80, the return of microfiches taken from the 6th IAEA inspection team by the Iraqi authorities, detailed schedule for the levelling of damaged buildings, and a site visit to such buildings, declaration on the Abu Sukhayr mine ore processed. In addition, a request for proposals regarding the destruction, and rendering harmless of equipment related to the centrifuge programme, research and development work on the use of cerium sulphide, research and study on the gun type design, hydrodynamic calculations, details of Po^{210} initiator design, and clarifications regarding the appearance of 93 % U-235 in environmental samples taken at Al Tuwaitha.

8-8. Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 911115 - documenting that the IAEA has shipped the first consignment of fresh highly enriched uranium from Iraq.

8-9. Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 911116 - requesting information on mainframe and other computing power used in the nuclear programme, additional tritium sources located, uranium metal production, and referring to an Al Atheer programme progress report movement of people and equipment from Al Tuwaitha to Al Atheer.

8-10. Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 911116 - acknowledging the receipt of the holding piece of a destroyed mandrel from the centrifuge flow forming machine.

8-11. Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 911117 - documenting that the IAEA has shipped the second consignment of fresh highly enriched uranium from Iraq.

8-12. Mr. Al Hajjaj to Mr. Perricos on 911117 - as a response to para 3 of the letter 911114 (item 8-7 above) providing information of the use of the streak cameras.

8-13. Mr. Al Hajjaj to Mr. Perricos on 911117 as a response to the letter 911116 (item 8-9 above) providing information on the mainframe and other computers at Al Tarmiya, Ash Sharkat and Al Tuwaitha, tritium sources, and tests and manufacturing of uranium metal at Al Tuwaitha.

8-14. Mr. Al Hajjaj to Mr. Perricos on 911117 - as a response to the letter of 911114 (item 8-7 above) providing information on Bismuth in Iraq, tools for graphite machining moved to Al Rabie Laboratory, EMIS ion sources from Al Tuwaitha, returning microfiches taken from the 6th IAEA team, timetable for the building removals at Al Tuwaitha, processed uranium ore from Abu Sukhayr mine, research conducted with cerium sulphide, gun type weapons, polonium used for initiators, and that they have never produced or obtained any quantities of 93% enriched uranium.

8-15. Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 911118 - acknowledging the receipt of 156 pcs of microfiches taken from the 6th IAEA inspection team, a segment sample of a ring from the center of a double pole (EMIS), and 3 pcs of vacuum valves.

8-16. Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 911118 - requesting additional information on the receipt of yellow cake from Portugal, differences found in pellets, UO_4 slurry and filters, UO_3 of Al Mosul, ADU of Al Mosul, UO_4 samples from Al Qaim, scrap, UO_2 from Brazil, UF_4, ADU and UCl_4 made from material of Brazilian origin, uranium penetrators, and retained waste at Al Mosul.

8-17. Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 911118 - requesting comments on the organization and functions of group IV of PC-3, which have been summarized using data from reports provided by Iraq.

8-18. Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 911118 - acknowledging the receipt of Hamamatsu streak video system components to the IAEA custody.

8-19. Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 911118 - requesting the destruction and rendering harmless of the EMIS related equipment, reminding the need to check water levels in storage tanks at location B, covering of the Po^{210} glove-boxes at Al Tuwaitha, and acknowledging the receipt of beryllium.

8-20. Mr. Al Hajjaj to Mr. Perricos on 911125 - referring to the discussions on the liquid uranium waste and informing that the containers are ready for shipment from the Al Mosul facility.

8-21. Mr. Al Hajjaj to Mr. Perricos on 911114 - informing about the reconstruction of buildings 10, 67, 82 and 90.

ANNEX 2

NUCLEAR AND OTHER MATERIAL VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES

Location C, Buildings 1 and 2 (Nuclear Material Storage)

Yellow cake inventory

a) Originating from Niger (199.9 tonnes uranium content in 858 drums). Part of this material (99.7 tonnes uranium content, 428 drums) had been stored at Tikrit and was moved to Location C, where the eighth team verified it.

b) Originating from Portugal (213 tonnes uranium content in 916 drums). Weighing showed that there was no difference between the shipper's weight-list and the IAEA weighing, with the exception of about 40 kg in one damaged drum. However, 100 drums have been painted and the identification numbers erased, so that there is no way of comparing the weights with the shipper's list. No adequate explanation has been given by Iraq concerning this issue.

c) Originating from Iraq - Al Qaim (2.2 tonnes uranium content in 12 drums). On 7 July 1991, the Iraqi side declared that a total of 164 tonnes of yellow cake was produced at Al Qaim, out of which 161 tonnes were processed in Al Jesira and the remaining 3 tonnes were stored at Tikrit. During the eighth inspection, these 3 tonnes of yellow cake (2.2 tonnes uranium content) in 12 drums were brought to Al Tuwaitha, verified and stored at Location C.

Nuclear material previously placed under Agency safeguards

a) 1 box containing 14 kg of uranium as UO_2 pellets (excluding 8.5 kg kept at the New Storage - Building 50 at Al Tuwaitha).

b) 37 filters containing UO_4 powder with a declared weight of 100 kg uranium content.

c) Uranium oxides. A total of 1,162 kg of uranium in various oxide forms in 46 containers.

The following discrepancies have been found regarding the material previously under safeguards:

a) The total uranium content in the UO_2 pellets presented by the Iraqi side is 33.9 kg (including 8.5 kg stored at the New Storage), which does not correspond to the 22.5 kg reported by the Iraqi side during the November 1990 IAEA safeguards inspection.

b) The weight of the 8 drums containing UO_4 slurry amounts to 1180kg. Additionally, 100 kg of uranium contained as UO_4 in 37 filters were declared and presented to the fourth team. During the eighth inspection, the Iraqi side declared orally that this material belonged to the inventory previously under safeguards. If that is the case, this amount is greater than what was previously under safeguards.

A written explanation of these discrepancies was requested on 18 November 1991.

UO_2 of Brazilian origin

A total of 27 tonnes of UO_2 was declared by the Iraq side in the 7 July 1991 declaration, and 22 578 kg (declared value) of UO_2 were presented in 227 containers as part of this material. The remaining 4422 kg were declared as having been processed in Al Tuwaitha Buildings 10, 15 and 85. The verification details are presented in Figure I.

Material processed in Building 10 - Al Tuwaitha

One tonne (approximately) of uranium metal in 22 containers is stored at Location C. It was processed by the reduction of UF_4 with magnesium. Part of this material (19.7 kg in one box containing uranium metal pieces cast and/or machined to various shapes) is stored in the New Storage. Additionally, the Iraqi side declared that 3.5 kg of uranium metal had been used in the production of armour-piercing shells.

Material processed in Building 15 - Al Tuwaitha

One cylinder contained 465 g of UF_6 produced by fluorination of UO_2. The Iraqi authorities also admitted to having tested the dry method for the fluorination of UO_2 using Freon gas, but no material produced this way was presented.

FIGURE I

Material processed using UO2 of Brazil Origin

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379 kg of UF_4 originally contained in 5 drums had been repackaged in three drums. Additionally, 73 kg of UO_2 and 30 kg of mixed uranium oxides were found inside the UF_4 containers.

Four containers with an aqueous solution of uranium slurry with a total uranium content of 6 kg were presented.

Material processed in Building 85 - Al Tuwaitha

1520 (compound weight) of UCl_4 were presented in 43 containers.

1850 kg of ammonium diuranate (ADU) contained in 31 drums were presented. The drums were emptied and the material placed in 11 drums and four containers with ADU scraps. Furthermore, two containers with 58 kg of UO_3 and one container with 39 kg of U_3O_8 were found inside the drums with ADU.

Material from the EMIS enrichment programme, in the form of liquid solutions and small sample bottles with powders containing natural, depleted and enriched uranium was presented in two drums.

The following discrepancies were found in the verification of the material of Brazilian origin:

a) The Iraqi side declared 22 578 kg of UO_2 remaining out of the 27 000 kg received from Brazil. After weighing of all the drums, the correct amount was found to be 23 348 kg.

b) The drums with UF_4 were found to contain the following material:

UF_4 :- 284 kg
UO_2 :- 73 kg
Mixed uranium oxides :- 30 kg

The declared contents were 379 kg of UF_4 (compound weight). The Iraqi side stated that the mixed uranium oxides were rejects from early development work.

c) All drums containing UCl_4 were weighed and, instead of the declared amount of 1520 kg, it was found that the amount contained was in excess of 3700 kg.

d) The Iraqi side declared 1850 kg of ADU. All drums were emptied and the following material found:

ADU :- 2,580 kg
ADU scrap :- 148 kg
UO_3 scrap :- 58 kg
U_3O_8 :- 39 kg

A written explanation of the discrepancies has been requested.

Figure I shows schematically the material processed at Al Tuwaitha using UO_2 of Brazilian origin. It compares the Iraqi declarations of material with the results obtained by weighing all the containers in which the produced material was presented.

On the basis of standard concentration values, it has been found that 5795.3kg uranium content were presented by the Iraqi side and that the uranium in the processed UO_2 amounted to 3214 kg.

A written explanation of this discrepancy has been requested.

Processed material originating from Al Qaim

This material, produced by the processing of 161 tonnes of yellow cake from Al Qaim, includes:

- 2250 kg of UO_4 in nine drums sent from Al Jesira to Tikrit and then moved to Location C during the eighth inspection.
- 96 095 kg of UO_2 presented to the third inspection team in 409 drums.
- 220 kg of ADU presented to the fourth team in three drums.
- 2050 kg of UO_3 declared on 7 July 1991 and presented in 44 drums. All the drums have been emptied and the UO_3 placed in eight drums. In addition to the UO_3, 200 kg of mixed uranium oxides in 19 containers were found. Also, 58 kg of UO_4 were found inside two UO_3 containers.
- 1207 kg of UCl_4 in eight containers were declared on 7 July 1991.
- 100 kg of U_3O_8 were presented in four containers.
- Two drums containing UO_4 samples were presented.

The following discrepancies were found with regard to the material of Al Qaim origin:

a) The amount of UO_2 declared on 7 July, 1991 was 96095 kg (in 409 drums). However, in a list presented by the Iraqi authorities later, the amount was 96967kg (in 409 drums).

b) The amount of ADU declared was 220 kg. However, the amount weighed was 317 kg.

c) The amount of UO_3 declared was 2050 kg. All containers were emptied and the following material found:

UO_3 :- 2020 kg
Mixed uranium oxides :- 200 kg
UO_4 :- 58 kg

d) Two drums containing 88 kg of UO_4 in sample bottles were presented to the third team but not included in any declaration.

Figure II shows schematically the flow of material into and out of Al Jesira. It compares the Iraqi declaration of material produced at Al Jesira with results obtained by weighing the material.

It was impossible to verify the material (16.73 tonnes of uranium) contained in the uranium waste tank but, on the basis of the value given by the Iraqi authorities, it was estimated that 105.735 tonnes of uranium were produced - not the declared amount of 104.65 tonnes.

The explanation given by the Iraqi authorities is that they overestimated the amount of uranium waste. In order to clarify the situation, they have proposed emptying the uranium waste tank and carrying out an accurate measurement of the uranium quantities.

One drum containing 53 kg of scrap presented to the third team was not included in any declaration. A written explanation about the origin of this material has been requested.

These verifications - summarized in Table 2 of the report - complete the activities required in order to verify the material brought to Location C. However, the results of destructive analysis, careful evaluation of all the data obtained during the different inspections and the discrepancies described above may call for some additional verification activities.

All the material at Location C has been left under seal. Figures III and IV show the arrangement of the nuclear material at Location C (Buildings 1 and 2).

FIGURE II

Flow Material in and out of AL JESIRA

Verified by weighing
AL QAIM
104.65 t NU as UO4
Declared value
AL-Jesira-Building 8
83.542 t NU as UO2
1.640 t NU as UO3
0.160 t NU as Mixed uranium oxides
0.048 t NU as UO4
0.084 t NU as U3O8
1.533 t NU as UO4 to Tbilisi
0.196 t NU as UO2 to AL-Tuwaitha to UCL4 Plant
0.9 t NU as UO2
AL-Jesira
Waste retention Basin
(Building 11, 12 and 13)
777 retained waste
AL-Jesira-UCL4 Plant
0.78 t NU as UCL4
* The U content of the mixed uranium oxides and the UO4 found inside the UO3 drums are based on estimated concentration of 90 %. The remaining values are those used in the inspr declaration.
Declared
AL QAIM
104.65 t NU as UO4
Declared value
AL-Jesira-Building 8
83.542 t NU as UO2
1.64 t NU as UO3
0.084 t NU as U3O8
1.533 t NU as UO4 to Tbilisi
0.196 t NU as UO2 to AL-Tuwaitha to UCL4 Plant
0.9 t NU as UO2
AL-Jesira
Waste retention Basin
(Building 11, 12 and 13)
16.73 t as retained waste
AL-Jesira-UCL4 Plant
0.78 t NU as UCL4

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FIGURE III

Building 1 of Location C


Yellow cake Portugal 100 Black Drums
UCl4 42 11 Plugs BRAZIL
1 UO4 6 mixed Ur. oxides 23 UO2 10 U3O8
BRAZIL
Yellow cake Portugal Red Drums 61
11 ADU 4 ADU Scrap 2 UO2 1 U3O8 BRAZIL
8 UCl4 Hoppers
UO2 Black Drums AL JEBIRA 186
AL JEBIRAL
UO2 Small Black Drums BRAZIL 201
UO2 3
10 Black Drums 3 Small Drums 1 Big Drum UO2
UO2 black drums AL JEBIRA 260
Yellow Cake, Red Drums Portugal 164
DOOR "D"
SIDE DOOR
MAIN DOOR
Truck
DOOR "C"
* 11 Metal Seals
STREET
* The UF6 is in the White Drum Containing Mixed U Oxides under Seal

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FIGURE IV

Building 2 of Location C



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Location C, Building 3 (Isotope Storage)

There are 115 radioisotopic sources stored at this location. As least nine of them are neutron sources and seven tritium sources.

During the eighth inspection, all sources were sealed, but detailed identification of them was left for a future inspection, when samples from the tritium sources should be taken. The Iraqi counterpart has been asked to provide additional information about the acquisition and utilization of the tritium sources.

Location C, Building 4

The Iraqi authorities declared that this building had been used for storing natural uranium and had been emptied after the bombing of Al Tuwaitha. Soil samples and smears were taken.

Verification activities at the IRT-5000 reactor

Verification of the nuclear material and beryllium blocks present at the IRT-5000 reactor was completed during the eighth inspection. There were 13 fuel elements in the spent fuel pond; they had previously been inaccessible for NDA verification. During this inspection, they were item-counted and four of them were randomly selected and measured by non-destructive assay techniques. The 17 beryllium blocks present at the reactor were also verified.

Verification activities at Location B

All the irradiated fuel and the beryllium blocks present at Location B were verified by seal checking.

Activities at the New Storage (Building 50 at Al Tuwaitha)

All remaining plutonium, U^{233} (63 mg) and Np^{237} (<0.2 g) was removed and sent to (SAL) the IAEA's Safeguards Analytical Laboratory. Nine seals were replaced.

Armour-piercing uranium penetrator programme

The Iraqi authorities have declared that 3.5 kg. of uranium metal had been used in producing ten bullets for an armour-piercing projectile programme being conducted at Hatteen. They presented three bullets and stated that three had been used for testing.